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It is an honor to be asked to deliver the Simon E. Sobeloff lec-
ture. Indeed, the more I learn about Judge Sobeloff's life, the more
honored I feel. It is hard to decide which of his many accomplish-
ments was the most impressive: delivering his first political speech at
the age of twelve; entering the University of Maryland Law School at
seventeen; sacrificing his Supreme Court hopes over a matter of prin-
ciple; or being praised for his writing style by H.L. Mencken!' I hope
that this Essay will in some small way reflect Judge Sobeloffs lifelong
commitment to liberty and justice under the rule of law.
II. MORAL PLURALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
While my analysis will move for the most part between philosophi-
cal theory and practical politics, I wish to begin with some remarks on
constitutional law. There is a line of cases that underscores the claims
of pluralism within a liberal constitutional order.
Consider, first, Meyer v. Nebraska,2 decided in 1923. Reflecting the
nativist passions stirred by World War One, the State of Nebraska had
passed a law forbidding instruction in any modem language other
than English, in any school, prior to the ninth grade.3 A teacher in a
Lutheran parochial school was convicted under this statute for the
crime of teaching a Bible class in German.4 The Supreme Court
struck down the law as a violation of the liberty guarantee of the Four-
* Professor, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland; Director, Institute for
Philosophy and Public Policy. B.A., Cornell University; M.A., University of Chicago; Ph.D.,
University of Chicago. This Essay was presented as the Judge Simon E. Sobeloff lecture at
the University of Maryland School of Law on February 13, 1997. An earlier version of this
Essay was presented at the conference "Liberalism and Its Critics," sponsored by the De-
partment of Philosophy of The George Washington University, in March 1996.
1. See MIcHAEL S. MAYER, SIMON E. SOBELOFF 1-2, 8-9, 17 (1980).
2. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
3. Id. at 397.
4. Id. at 396.
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teenth Amendment.5 Writing for the Court, Justice McReynolds
stated:
That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, in or-
der to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally
and morally, is clear; but the individual has certain funda-
mental rights which must be respected....
The desire of the legislature to foster a homogeneous
people with American ideals prepared readily to understand
current discussions of civic matters is easy to appreciate....
But the means adopted, we think, exceed the limitations
upon the power of the State and conflict with rights assured
to plaintiff in error.6
The majority opinion identified the underlying theory of the Ne-
braska law with the plenipotentiary state of Sparta and with Plato's
Republic, which it quoted at length and sharply distinguished from the
underlying theory of liberal constitutionalism.'
Consider, second, the case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters,' decided in
1925. The people of Oregon had adopted, as a ballot initiative, a law
requiring parents and legal guardians to send all students between the
ages of eight and sixteen to public schools.9 The Society of Sisters, an
Oregon corporation that among other activities maintained a system
of Catholic schools, sued to overturn this law as inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment. 10 The Court emphatically agreed:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all govern-
ments in this Union repose excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to ac-
cept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 1
Consider, finally, the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 2 decided by the
Supreme Court a quarter century ago. This case presented a clash
5. Id. at 399, 403.
6. Id. at 401-02.
7. Id. Justice Holmes, revered in some quarters as a civil libertarian, dissented; he
was, he said "unable to say that the Constitution of the United States prevents the experi-
ment being tried." Id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
9. Id. at 530.
10. Id. at 531-32.
11. Id. at 535.
12. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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between a Wisconsin law, which required school attendance until age
sixteen, and the Old Order Amish, who claimed that high-school at-
tendance would undermine their faith-based community life. 3 A ma-
jority of the Court agreed with the Amish and denied that the State of
Wisconsin had made a compelling case for intervening against their
practices:
[H]owever strong the State's interest in universal compul-
sory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests.
[.. T] his case involves the fundamental interest of par-
ents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the reli-
gious future and education of their children. 14
The Court's decision in Yoder has been contested on many fronts.
Citing Hobbes and Locke, the conservative theorist Walter Berns has
attacked it as an intolerable infringement of state authority-indeed,
as a tacit endorsement of anarchy.1" Following Justice Douglas's dis-
sent,16 Ian Shapiro and Richard Arneson have argued that the deci-
sion is inconsistent with the autonomy interests of the Amish
children. 7 And theorists concerned above all with encouraging dem-
ocratic deliberation have charged that under Yoder, these children will
acquire neither the information nor the motivation to participate ef-
fectively in public life.18
By contrast, I want to argue that Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder were cor-
rectly decided, not only from a constitutional standpoint, but also in
accordance with the soundest understanding of citizenship and state
power in a liberal democracy. A free society will defend the liberty of
individuals to lead many different ways of life. It will also protect a
zone within which individuals will freely associate to pursue shared
13. Id. at 209.
14. Id. at 215, 232 (citations omitted).
15. See WALTER BEPRNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FuTuRE OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 37-44 (1985).
16. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 24149 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. See Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious Freedom: A
Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in LAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE 137, 153-55 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557, 567
(1995) ("Any defensible standard of civic education must be committed to prepare chil-
dren for the rights and responsibilities of citizenship even over the opposition of their
parents."); Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case
of God v. John Rawls , 105 ETHICS 468, 486 (1995) ("[S]ome level of awareness of alternative
ways of life is a prerequisite not only of citizenship but of being able to make the most basic
life choices.").
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purposes and express distinctive identities, creating a dense network
of human connections called civil society.
But the boundaries of this protected zone are contested. The
laws and regulations of the political community can conflict with the
practices of voluntary associations. This conflict has escalated during
the twentieth century, as the extension of state power has multiplied
the public principles held to be binding on civil associations. Many of
these principles are designed to ensure that these associations do not
arbitrarily exclude, or abuse, specific individuals; the principles pro-
mote public purposes widely accepted as morally compelling.
We are familiar with the moral advantages of central state power;
we must also attend to its moral costs. There is what might be called a
paradox of diversity: if we insist that each civil association mirror the
principles of the overarching political community, then meaningful
differences among associations all but disappear; constitutional uni-
formity crushes social pluralism. If, as I shall argue, our moral world
contains plural and conflicting values, then the overzealous enforce-
ment of general public principles runs the risk of interfering with
morally legitimate individual and associational practices.
The issue before contemporary constitutional law and liberal
democratic theory is not just (as some seem to believe) 19 the nature of
the procedures by which binding collective decisions should be made,
but also the legitimate scope of such decisions. My argument consti-
tutes a challenge both to the classical Greek conception of the polit-
ical order as the all-encompassing association 20 and to the Hobbesian
conception of plenipotentiary sovereign power.2 ' A liberal polity
guided (as I believe it should be) by a commitment to value pluralism
will be parsimonious in specifying binding public principles and cau-
tious about employing such principles to intervene in the internal af-
fairs of civil associations. It will rather pursue a policy of maximum
feasible accommodation, limited only by the minimum requirements of
individual security and civic unity.
That there are moral costs to such a policy cannot reasonably be
denied. It will permit internal associational practices (for example,
patriarchal gender relations) of which many strongly disapprove, and
it will allow many associations to define their membership in ways that
may be seen as restraints on individual liberty. But as Laurence Tribe
19. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRICS (1989) (presenting a theory
of democratic process).
20. See especially ARiSTOTLE, POLITICS bk. 1, ch. 2 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Claren-
don Press 1995).
21. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEviATHAN pt. 2, ch. 18 (Dent 1987) (1651).
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has pointed out, this difficulty inheres in the very idea of freedom of
association: "rights to associate with X are necessarily rights to dissoci-
ate from Y.... [T] he right of one person or group to exclude others
is inevitably a limitation upon the freedom-including the associa-
tional freedom-of those others."22 Unless the very idea of freedom
of association is to be narrowed dramatically, this moral cost must be
accepted.
III. THE MASTER-IDEAS OF LIBERAL THOUGHT
The current debate over the relation between value pluralism
and political liberalism began when the British philosopher John
Gray-an ardent foe of the "new liberalism" represented by John
Rawls and company-extended his critique to a paradigmatic liberal,
Isaiah Berlin.2" Berlin is famous for two master-ideas. First, he depicts
a moral universe in which important values are plural, conflicting, in-
commensurable in theory, and uncombinable in practice-a world in
which there is no single, univocal summum bonum that can be defined
philosophically, let alone imposed politically.24 And second, he de-
fends negative liberty, understood as the capacity to choose among
competing conceptions of good or valuable lives, as the core value of
liberal political thought.25
Gray's basic point is that these two master-ideas do not fit to-
gether entirely comfortably.26 The more seriously we take value plu-
ralism, the less inclined we will be to give pride of place to freedom or
autonomy ("negative liberty") as a good that trumps all others.2 7 We
will recognize that lives defined by habit, tradition, or the acceptance
of authority can be valid forms of human flourishing.28 We will there-
fore conclude that liberalism-understood as the philosophy of socie-
ties in which liberty or autonomy takes pride of place-enjoys only
local authority.29 If value pluralism is correct, liberalism cannot sus-
tain its universalist claims and emerges at best as one valid form of
political association among many others.3 0
My argument is that the fit between value pluralism and political
liberalism is tighter than Gray supposes, but that, nonetheless, his ob-
22. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-17, at 1401 (2d ed. 1988).
23. SeeJOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN (1996).
24. Id. at 25.
25. Id. at 26.
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jection has important implications for our understanding of the role
of deep pluralism within liberal societies. To show this, I will first at-
tempt to clarify the philosophical claims of value pluralism, and then
draw out its political consequences.
IV. DEFINING VALUE PLURALISM
Value pluralism is not an argument for radical skepticism, or for
relativism. The moral philosophy of pluralism stands between relativ-
ism and absolutism. This can be demonstrated fairly quickly:
It is not relativist. From a value-pluralist perspective, some things
(the great evils of human existence) are objectively bad, to be avoided
in both our individual and collective lives."1 Conversely, some things
are objectively good (recall Stuart Hampshire on the "minimum com-
mon basis for a tolerable human life" 2 or H.L.A. Hart on the "mini-
mum content of natural law"33).
Nor is value pluralism absolutist.3 4 There are multiple goods that
cannot be reduced to a common measure, cannot be ranked in a clear
order of priority, and do not form a harmonious whole.35 There is no
single conception of the good valid for all individuals: what's good for
A may not be equally good for B. Nor is there one preferred structure
for weighing goods. In our moral as well as material lives, there are
more desirable goods than any one individual or group can possibly
encompass; to give one kind of good pride of place is necessarily to
subordinate, or exclude, others. Some individuals and groups may be
morally broader than others, but none is morally universal.
V. AUTONOMY AND DIVERSITY
What is the relation between value pluralism, thus understood,
and the political philosophy of liberalism? One answer-that there
exists between them a correspondence of fundamental attitude-is of-
fered by Michael Walzer, who observes:
I don't know anyone who believes in value pluralism who
isn't a liberal, in sensibility as well as conviction.
. . . You have to look at the world in a receptive and
generous way to see a pluralism of Berlin's sort .... And you
also have to look at the world in a skeptical way, since the
31. See STUART HAMPSHIRE, MORAU-rY AND CONFUCT 154-55 (1983).
32. STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 33 (1989).
33. H.LA HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 189-95 (1961).
34. See BRIAN BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT xxxix-xliv, 3-8 (reissue with new introduction
1990) (1965).
35. See id. at 3-8.
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adherents of each of the different values are likely to rank
them very high on a scale designed for just that purpose.
And receptivity, generosity, and skepticism are, if not liberal
values, then qualities of mind that make it possible to accept
liberal values (or, better, that make it likely that liberal values
will be accepted),.6
This is surely a plausible conjecture. But I would also argue for a
more formal logical relation: If the moral philosophy of pluralism is
roughly correct, then there is a range of indeterminacy within which
various choices are rationally defensible. Pluralism is one premise in
an argument for a protected zone of moral liberty. The argument
runs as follows. Because there is no one uniquely rational ordering or
combination of incommensurable values, no one could ever provide a
generally valid reason, binding on all individuals, for a particular rank-
ing or combination. And, under what might be called the principle of
rational authority, a generally valid reason of this sort, while not a suffi-
cient condition for restricting the liberty of individuals to lead a range
of diverse lives, is certainly a necessary condition.
Note that this case for a zone of liberty is a claim about limits on
coercive interference in individual or group ways of life. It is not an
argument that each way of life must itself embody a preference for
liberty. This distinction-liberty within ways of life versus liberty be-
tween ways of life-is part of a broader contrast.
There are two quite different standpoints for understanding
modern life, with different historical roots. The first of these, which
gives pride of place to autonomy, is linked to what may be called the
Enlightenment project-the experience of liberation, through rea-
son, from externally imposed authority. 7 Within this project, the ex-
amined life is understood as superior to reliance on tradition or faith,
and preference is given to self-direction over any external determina-
tion of the will.
The alternative standpoint, which gives pride of place to diversity,
finds its roots in what I shall call the Reformation project-that is, the
effort to deal with the political consequences of religious differences
emerging within Christendom. In this project, the central task is that
36. Michael Walzer, Are There Limits to Liberalism?, N.Y. REv. BOoKS, Oct. 19, 1995, at 28,
31.
37. The "Enlightenment project" is my term. For related discussions, see JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvi-xxviii (1993) and Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 POL.
THEORY 339, 342-46 (1990).
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of accepting and managing diversity through mutual toleration within
a framework of civic unity.
38
In my judgment, social theorists-especially liberals 3 9-go astray
when they give pride of place to an ideal of personal autonomy, un-
derstood as the capacity for critical reflection and for choice guided
by such reflection. The inevitable consequence is that the state takes
sides in the ongoing tension between reason and faith, reflection and
tradition, needlessly marginalizing and antagonizing groups that can-
not conscientiously embrace the Enlightenment project.
Rightly understood, liberalism is about the protection of diversity,
not the promotion of autonomy. In practice, liberal societies are un-
usually hospitable to critical reflection of all kinds.4" But that doesn't
mean that the cultivation of critical reflection is a higher-order polit-
ical goal: liberal societies can and must make room for individuals
and groups whose lives are guided by tradition, authority, and faith.
It may be suggested that while autonomy poses clear challenges
to faith, the moral philosophy of value pluralism is not straightfor-
wardly hospitable to faith either. This is true. Some faiths purport to
establish clear hierarchies of values, with universally binding higher-
order purposes.4 ' Some faiths argue for sociopolitical domination,
against the idea of a free civil space.42 Clearly value pluralism cuts
against these claims.
Still, there are zones of overlap between value pluralism and reli-
gious belief. In practice, even well-articulated faiths are characterized
by internal value pluralism. And once the multiplicity of faiths is an
irreversible fact, other considerations-many themselves faith-based-
come into play to restrict state coercion on behalf of any single faith.
This is a kind of restraint on certain religious practices, and it may
well stack the deck in favor of faiths that emphasize inward conscience
rather than external observance. Nonetheless, value pluralism estab-
lishes a meaningful social space for religious belief and practice.
38. The "Reformation project" is also my term. For discussion, see supra note 37 and
sources cited therein.
39. See WILLIAm A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PuRPosEs: GOODS, VIRTUES, ANI' DwE~srrv IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 329 n.12 (1991) (criticizing Gutmann's, supra note 18, and Macedo's, supra
note 18, emphasis on autonomous choice as "a drive toward a kind of uniformity, disguised
in the language of liberal diversity").
40. The standard examples of this include a rigorous free press, public competition
among political doctrines and parties, wide scope for scientific inquiry, universities not
under state control, and religious diversity.
41. See, e.g., 1 Corinthians 13:13 ("So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the great-
est of these is love.").





As this discussion suggests, there is a distinction between plural-
ism at the level of individual lives and at the level of political institu-
tions. Two differences are key.
A. The Political Weighing of Competing Values
Even if there are no binding rational principles guiding individu-
als' weighing of competing goods, the same need not be the case for
political choices. For example, suppose you take as a basic principle
of political morality that each person or group is to be treated in ac-
cordance with the strength of its valid claims. In the context of value
pluralism, this warrants a strategy of compromise and balance to ac-
commodate multiple valid claims. So understood, the politics of com-
promise is not an unprincipled, split-the-difference tactical
pragmatism; nor is it the pursuit of conflict reduction for its own sake,
a bare modus vivendi. Rather, it is the right thing to do in circum-
stances of value pluralism. (This is also an argument in favor of the
messiness of politics and against a pernicious legalism that absolutizes
competing claims and creates winner-take-all outcomes.)
My experience dealing with policy disputes while in government
reinforces my confidence in this assertion. In case after case, I en-
countered many conflicting arguments, each of which seemed reason-
able up to a point. Each appealed to an important aspect of our
individual or collective good, or to deep-seated moral beliefs. Typi-
cally, there was no way of reducing these heterogeneous values to a
single common measure. Nor was there an obvious way of giving one
aspect of our moral experience absolute priority over others. The
most difficult choices in politics, I came to believe, are not between
good and evil but between good and good.
It is true that value pluralism does not always yield a tranquil or
straightforward decisionmaking process. As Philip Teflock has ar-
gued, conflicts among valued goods generate acute discomfort and
typically lead to modes of evasion-particularly when some or all of
the values are (in Durkheim's sense) sacred rather than secular, or
when decisionmakers are enmeshed in processes of accountability
that make it costly to acknowledge that trade-offs must be made.4"
Still, even if we cannot reduce qualitatively different claims to a
common measure, there may be ways of deliberating about trade-offs
43. Philip Tetlock et al., Revising the Value Pluralism Model: Incorporating Social
Content and Context Postulates, paper presented at the Eighth Ontario Symposium on
Personality and Social Psychology: Values, London, Ontario (Aug. 17-18, 1993).
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among them that allow us to distinguish between more and less rea-
sonable outcomes. For example, the claim that one good should en-
joy an absolute or lexical priority over others is typically hard to
sustain in a deliberative political context. In situations in which an
increment of one good can be obtained only at the cost of rapidly
increasing losses of other goods, most people will agree that at some
point enough is enough. They also realize that circumstances alter
cases. Gray sometimes uses existentialist language to characterize the
politics of value pluralism. 4 But his focus on radical choice, un-
guided by reason, seems empirically dubious. There are considera-
tions short of mathematical or logical rigor that nonetheless incline
people to agree on a decision.
B. Narrowness and Capaciousness
We can draw a second distinction between individual and social
pluralism. While any particular life necessarily represents a narrowing
of value-one among many possible rankings and combinations of
values and goods-the same is not the case (at least not in the same
way and to the same extent) for societies. Some societies may embody
a collective narrowing-an individual choice writ large. Others may
represent capaciousness-that is, they may encompass a range of ways
of life that can neither be commensurated nor combined at the level
of individuals.45
Does value pluralism entail a preference for social capaciousness
over social narrowing? Gray's position is that the preference for capa-
ciousness is a matter of history rather than logical entailment; it re-
flects the central role of autonomy in our culture, and the fact of
(increasing) interpenetration of cultures, which in many circum-
stances can be halted and reversed only through tactics ranging from
the coercive to the barbaric.4 6 But capaciousness, Gray argues, is not
required in circumstances in which homogeneity may be preserved
(through tradition, precedent, or authority) unless deliberately per-
turbed by outside influences.47
My view of the relation between value pluralism and social capa-
ciousness is quite different. It rests on a modest proposition concern-
ing what might be called philosophical anthropology. While it is true,
44. See GRAY, supra note 23, at 8-9.
45. An example of collective narrowing would be ancient Sparta, where family life,
education, and public resources were all directed toward the cultivation of military virtues.
The contemporary United States is an example of what I am calling "capaciousness."
46. JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISMS: ESSAYS IN PoLric.AL PHILosoPHY 241-42 (1989).
47. Id. at 213-15.
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as Gray suggests, that we are beings whose good is given only in part
by our (generic) 48 nature, it is also the case that the diversity of
human types is part of what is given. A narrow society is one in which
only a small fraction of inhabitants can live their lives in a manner
consistent with their flourishing and satisfaction. The rest will be
pinched and stunted to some considerable degree. All else being
equal, this is an undesirable situation, and one that is best avoided.
To the maximum extent possible in human affairs, liberal societies do
avoid this kind of pinching. This is an important element of their
vindication as a superior mode of political organization.
Gray has rightly argued that liberal polities are not neutral in
their sociological effects; certain forms of life are placed in the defen-
sive, or marginalized.49 Still, there is more scope for diversity in lib-
eral societies than anywhere else. And those societies have it in their
power to adopt policies that maximize the possibility of legitimate
diversity.
VII. LIBERAL POLITICS AND Cwic DIvERsrry
Within liberal political orders (as in all others), there must be
some encompassing political norms. The question is how "thick" the
political is to be. The answer will help determine the scope of legiti-
mate state intervention in the lives of individuals, and in the internal
processes of organizing that make up civil society.
The constitutional politics of value pluralism will seek to restrict
enforceable general norms to the essentials. By this standard, the
grounds for national political norms and state intervention include
basic order and physical protection; the sorts of goods that Hamp-
shire, Hart, and others have identified as necessary for tolerable indi-
vidual and collective life;5  and the components of shared national
citizenship. It is difficult, after all, to see how societies can endure
without some measure of order and material decency. And since Aris-
totle's classic discussion of the matter,5" it has been evident that polit-
ical communities are organized around conceptions of citizenship
that they are required to defend.
But how much farther should the state go in enforcing specific
conceptions of justice, authority, or the good life? What kinds of dif-
48. Id. at 257.
49. Id. at 260.
50. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 39, at 178 (tracing the "commitment to life" to "public
efforts to protect individuals against violence" to the justification for government interven-
tion in the form of public education campaigns).
51. ARISTOTLE, supra note 20.
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ferences should the state permit? What kinds of differences may the
state encourage or support? This is, of course, a normative issue:
What are the principled limits to state power? But it is also an empiri-
cal question: Must civil associations mirror the constitutional order if
they are to sustain that order?
The political theorist Nancy Rosenblum has answered that ques-
tion in the negative.52 Rosenblum asks us to look at different func-
tions of civil associations.53 They can express liberty as well as
personal or social identity, provide arenas for the accommodation of
deep differences, temper individual self-interest, help integrate other-
wise disconnected individuals into society, nurture trust, serve as seed-
beds of citizenship, and resist the totalizing tendencies of both closed
communities and state power. 4
It is not obvious as an empirical matter that civil-society organiza-
tions within liberal democracies must be organized along liberal dem-
ocratic lines in order to perform some or all of these functions.
Consider recent findings reported by the political scientists Sidney
Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady: religious organiza-
tions-including fundamentalist churches-serve as important seed-
beds of political skills, particularly for those without large amounts of
other politically relevant assets such as education and money.55 There
is room for deep disagreement about the policies that many religious
groups are advocating in the political arena. But there seems little
doubt that these groups have fostered political education and engage-
ment to an extent few other kinds of associations can match, at a time
when most social forces are pushing toward political and civic
disengagement.56
As a general matter, then, the liberal democratic polity should
not casually interfere with organizations that don't conduct their in-
ternal affairs in conformity with broader political norms. At one level,
this point is obvious: I take it that we would agree, for example, that
antidiscrimination laws should not be invoked to end the Catholic
Church's exclusion of women from the priesthood.
But let's move to a less clear-cut example. Consider the issues
raised in the case of Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
52. Nancy L. Rosenblum, Civil Societies: Liberalism and the Moral Uses of Pluralism, 61
Soc. REs. 539 (1994).
53. Id. at 551-57.
54. Id.
55. SIDNEY VERBA ET AL., VOICE AND EQUAuTY. Crvic VOLUNTARISM IN AMERICAN Pou-
TIcs 325-30 (1995).
56. Id. at 317-30.
1998]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Schools.57 A private fundamentalist school decided not to renew the
contract of a pregnant married teacher because of its religiously based
belief that mothers with young children should not work outside their
homes. 5' After receiving a complaint from the teacher, the Civil
Rights Commission investigated, found probable cause to conclude
that the school had discriminated against an employee on the basis of
her sex, and proposed a consent order including full reinstatement
with back pay.59 The Dayton Christian Schools sued the Commission,
arguing that any investigation or sanctions would violate the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.6 °
As Frederick Mark Gedicks observes, this case involves a clash be-
tween a general public norm (nondiscrimination) and the constitutive
beliefs of a civil association.61 The teacher unquestionably exper-
ienced serious injury through loss of employment.6 2 On the other
hand, forcing the school to rehire her would clearly impair the ability
of the religious community of which it formed a key part to exercise
its distinctive religious views-not just to profess them, but also to ex-
press them in its practices." The imposition of state-endorsed beliefs
on that community would threaten core functions of diverse civil as-
sociations-the expression of a range of conceptions of the good life
and the mitigation of state power.64 In this case and others like it, a
liberal politics guided by value pluralism would give priority to the
claims of civil associations.65
Current federal legislation and constitutional doctrine reflect this
priority to a considerable degree. Thus, although Tite VII of the Civil
Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion,66 section 702 of the statute exempts religious organizations. 67 In
the case of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,68 the Supreme Court not only upheld this
accommodation in principle but also extended its reach to a wide
57. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
58. Id. at 623.
59. Id. at 623-24.
60. Id. at 624-25.
61. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group
Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99, 101.
62. Id. at 102.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Cf id. at 115.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
67. Id. § 2000e-1 (a).
68. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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range of secular activities conducted under the aegis of religious
organizations.69
This does not mean that all religiously motivated practices are
deserving of accommodation. Some clearly aren't. No civil associa-
tion can be permitted to engage in human sacrifice: there can be no
free exercise for Aztecs. Nor can a civil association endanger the basic
interests of children by withholding medical treatment in life-threat-
ening situations. But there is a basic distinction between the minimal
content of the human good, which the state must defend, and diverse
conceptions of flourishing above that baseline, which the state must
accommodate to the maximum extent possible. There is room for
reasonable disagreement as to where that line should be drawn. But
the moral philosophy of pluralism should make us very cautious about
expanding the scope of state power in ways that coerce uniformity.
There are two complications for the position I have described.
First, the expansion of the modem state means that most civil associa-
tions are now entangled with it in one way or another. If participation
in public programs means that civil associations must govern their in-
ternal affairs by general public principles, then the zone of diversity is
dangerously narrowed. There should therefore be some relaxation of
the prevailing legal doctrine that the state cannot do indirectly what it
is forbidden to do directly.
Second, there is a distinction between permission and encourage-
ment. There is no requirement that the state confer benefits on civil
associations that violate important public principles. In my judgment,
the Bob Jones case was correctly decided.7"
VIII. A RIGHT OF EXIT
I want to conclude with a brief discussion of the conception of
liberty flowing from the pluralist view. Within broad limits, civil as-
sociations may order their internal affairs as they see fit. Their norms
and decisionmaking structures may significantly abridge individual
freedom and autonomy without legitimating external state interfer-
ence. But these associations may not coerce individuals to remain as
members against their will. Thus there is a form of liberty whose pro-
motion is a higher-order political goal: individuals' right of exit from
groups and associations that make up civil society. This liberty will
69. Id. at 336, 338.
70. BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (denying tax-exempt status to




involve not only insulation from certain kinds of state interference,
but also a range of affirmative state protections.
To see why this is so, we need only reflect on the necessary condi-
tions for a meaningful right of exit. These include knowledge condi-
tions, offering chances for awareness of alternatives to the life one is
in fact living; psychological conditions, including freedom from the
kinds of brainwashing practiced by cults; fitness conditions, or the
ability of individuals to participate effectively in some ways of life other
than the one they wish to leave; and social diversity, affording an array
of meaningful options.
This last points to a background feature of the judgment I ex-
pressed regarding the case of Dayton Christian Schools--the existence
of employment alternatives for the affected teacher. If that religious
community had been coextensive with the wider society-if there
were no practical exit from its arena of control-my conclusion would
have to be significantly revised. The pluralist concept of liberty is not
just a philosophical abstraction; it is anchored in a concrete vision of a
pluralist society in which the innate human capacity for different
modes of individual and group flourishing has to some significant de-
gree been realized.
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